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Breaking Ground on a Theory of 
 Transgender Architecture 
Lucas Cassidy Crawford1 
INTRODUCTION 
By now, the Brandon Teena story is well archived.2 In 1993, John Lotter 
and Marvin Thomas Nissen discovered that their friend had been born 
“female.” The two men learned about Brandon’s genitals—those bodily bits 
which prompted the men’s brutality—because of one seemingly simple fact: 
after committing a minor misdemeanor, Brandon was held in a cellblock for 
females.3 After sexually assaulting Brandon, the men were eventually 
questioned but never detained. They murdered Brandon days later. If it 
wasn’t obvious why institutional sex-segregated architectures (from public 
washrooms to shelters) are dangerous for transgender people before 1993, it 
should have become obvious thereafter.  
It is easy to make an argument that it is exclusively transphobia and 
ignorance about trans-embodiment that grounds this often dangerous lack of 
access. However, as architectural theorist Joel Sanders notes, architecture is 
not a simple or neutral aesthetic category to which gender is merely 
applied.4 Like any art form or cultural production, he suggests, architecture 
is shaped as much by contemporary gender norms as contemporary 
aesthetic ones. As Sanders puts it: “Western architects and theorists from 
Vitruvius to Le Corbusier . . . attempt to locate and to fix architecture’s 
underlying principles in a vision of transhistorical nature [by] recruit[ing] 
masculinity to justify practice.”5 To Sanders, the seeming gender neutrality 
of architecture is merely a product of modernist architecture’s attempt to 
appear transhistorical6—as a timeless style of architecture above and 
beyond fashion. This quotation from Sanders traces out a dizzying cycle of 
influence: in his view, architectural forms and gendered bodies mutually 
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reinforce each other’s feigned timelessness and stability. This paper takes 
up one overarching question, one that takes this cycle one step further: how 
have these gender-based conventions of architectural stability and 
timelessness seeped into our ways of thinking of our bodies? 
This article responds to this question via two related arguments: first, that 
the fraught historical relationship between gender and architecture has 
always been underpinned by a variously elided sense of gender-crossing—a 
sense that needs to be cast out in order to uphold the male/masculine aura of 
the architectural discipline.7 As an obvious and, in some ways, 
overdetermined example, I look to several key gender-charged moments 
from the earliest known archive of Roman architecture, Vitruvius’ De 
Architectura.8 If architecture is in some ways an archive of gender (as the 
first section of this article argues), then our academic and activist attempts 
to make architecture more “transgender-friendly” might need to change; 
that is, perhaps we can begin by asking how transgender is already inherent 
and repressed by conventional architecture rather than talking about 
transgender as a novel and heretofore silenced topic of concern for 
architects and architectural theorists. 
Secondly, in order to preserve the possibility for disruptive trans 
architecture that we see even in Vitruvius, the second section of this article 
suggests that the architectural metaphors often employed in contemporary 
transgender theory literally domesticate the trans subject. I argue that the 
common narrative of not feeling “at home in one’s skin” 9 that is shared by 
many transsexual autobiographers and theorists has subsumed this history—
or at least illustrated its erasure—with its problematic yet nonetheless 
enthralling version of “home.” Via analyses of different conceptions of 
“home” from Marxist thinkers Theodor Adorno10 and Leslie Feinberg,11 this 
article attempts to offer an alternative architectural conception of trans-
embodiment, one that is not based on the assumption that bodies must be 
treated as comfortable and owned homes. While these two thinkers are quite 
different thematically,12 both consider ownership as a central mode through 
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which social inequalities are generated.13 In part, this article transfers 
Adorno’s and Feinberg’s shared apprehension about ownership from the 
social body at-large to our individual bodies and discusses the ways in 
which we think about them. While neo-Marxist thinkers such as these 
question the justice of various kinds of ownership, what kind of capitalist 
ideas underlie our common tendency to refer to (and experience) the body 
as a home that we own?  
Taken together, these two arguments suggest that there is much to be 
gained by rethinking the spatial metaphors with which we describe 
ourselves. Underlying this suggestion is the belief that our ways of spatially 
figuring the body in thought and language—what we could call our 
architectonics of the body—do not merely represent our bodily experience 
but also shape it. Ultimately then, this article suggests that far from being an 
afterthought that we may, or may not, want to include in our architectural 
(and cultural) blueprints, transgender and transsexuality may even be 
exemplary architectural practices and also the very bases for thinking of 
bodies architecturally.14 Such an argument will not only address—albeit 
obliquely—the urgent need that transgender people have for new ways of 
conceiving of our bodies, buildings, and homes, but will also offer crucial 
caution to those who design our hallway paths and doorway thresholds, who 
advocate single-sex washrooms, and of course, to those who lend any 
administrative, legal, or quotidian momentum to the ongoing cultural 
project of guiding trans people to cellblocks of all varieties.  
While Vitruvius, Adorno, and Feinberg make up the group of strange 
bedfellows that inform most of this essay’s interventions, the work of one 
other thinker is constantly at work here: Jacques Derrida, specifically his 
1994 text Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression.15 Among other complex 
overarching projects, this text moves to the fore the figure of the “archive”16 
as not only a way to rethink the processes by which history gets made, 
reproduced, and told, but moreover to point out the spatial origins of our 
relatively new obsession with recording and saving everything. In other 
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words, what Derrida calls our “archive drive”17 might help us to reconsider 
the imperative that to be or to build only timeless-seeming structures and 
bodies is not only an impossible one but one that encourages us to ignore 
the complex and multiple histories of bodies. The figure of the archive—a 
place that seeks to consolidate all times—is always, Derrida suggests, an 
institution of “command” and “commencement,”18 insofar as the 
consolidation of history that the archive represents is one fixated with 
origins and power.  
Although Derrida notes that the Greek version of the word “archive” 
witnesses the word’s beginnings as “a house, a domicile, an address, the 
residence of the superior magistrates,”19 he does not mention that the word 
“architecture” shares this powerful etymology of containing, constraining, 
and commanding. If, then, buildings not only house actual archives, but 
houses and cellblocks are themselves archival (in their materialization of, 
for instance, gender norms), it is easy to see that Brandon Teena’s body and 
his jail cell were implicated in a practice of mutual inscription. That is, the 
cellblock’s authority to inscribe “woman” upon Brandon relies on the subtle 
gendered norms of buildings that are consolidated through thousands of 
years’ worth of architectural tradition and memory; likewise, such single-
sex spaces imprint Brandon Teena’s body as transgender and concurrently 
discipline it as such. In the terms of Derrida’s text, the space of the prison 
returns to the “commencement”20 of Brandon Teena’s life and 
identification, seeking an “original” gender upon which the “command[s]”21 
of law can be exercised. When Brandon Teena was released from prison 
and murdered shortly thereafter, we see—in a fashion at least as literal as 
Foucault’s22—that a panopticon creates, as well as holds, its outlaws. This is 
one sense in which buildings are archives: they can put an anonymous face 
on our culture’s tendency to cast back through whatever means possible to 
origins, including supposed origins of gender. 
However, buildings are not merely architectural archives of the gender 
norms of the day. They also come to function as very particular kinds of 
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affective archives.23 That is, while such features as dark hallways or 
unmonitored washrooms are only risky because of the violence in our 
gender-normative culture, the way in which fear manifests itself in the body 
in those moments is often not in terms of these seemingly neutral 
architectural features; that is, we are accustomed to thinking that we are 
afraid of people and not of built features. However, because fear and 
humiliation are surely much more complicated affects than simple 
responses to bodily danger or insult, it is often unavoidable to fear (or, 
conversely, desire) certain built structures themselves. In this way, 
buildings can become virtual archives of affect, where people’s shared 
memories and affective experiences of particular architectural features 
define a site as much as anything else. All of this is to say that moving 
through certain spaces makes us tap into our own archives of emotional 
experience. A transgender person who flushes with anger and indignity 
when passing by a certain washroom that once proved problematic (or, 
conversely, with excitement by one that proved interesting) can relate. This 
architectural archiving of affect is a second way in which we can think 
about buildings as producing affective archives for their users. 
In light of these two definitions of architecture-as-archive, the 
prescriptive—or hopeful—element of this article is to suggest that this 
reconceptualization of memory might help us disrupt our taken-for-granted 
notions about the timelessness or transhistoricity of gender and architecture. 
Following the two arguments made below about the risks of thinking about 
bodies as stable architecture or homes, this article ends by suggesting that 
we replace our figure of the body-as-home with one of body-as-archive. 
Though this figure of the archive is far from a utopian one (with its 
attendant senses of control and access),24 might its openness—its ability to 
change, move, and be constantly erased and supplemented—offer a more 
interesting architectonic of the body?25 
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I. A LITTLE OF COLUMN A, A LITTLE OF COLUMN B 
While finding an origin for transgender in architectural practice would be 
quite beside the point in any analysis seeking to think critically about the 
process of archiving, Vitruvius’s De Architectura (the earliest surviving 
treatise of Roman architecture) shows that the mutually constitutive 
relationship of gender and architecture is neither new nor simple.26 
Vitruvius’s text reveals that transgender was present as a threatening 
supplement even at this moment of supposed architectural Genesis.27 In his 
germinal and oft-studied text,28 Vitruvius vividly describes the way in 
which the principles of building were based on the supposed proportion and 
symmetry of the human body. Like our own myth of Genesis, Vitruvius’s 
origin story begins with two forms: the male and the female. In the 
following description, it is obvious that, for Vitruvius, architectural norms 
begin with gender norms. 
Without symmetry and proportion there can be no principles in the 
design of any temple; that is, if there is no precise relation between 
its members, as in the case of those of a well-shaped man. For the 
human body is so designed by nature that the face, from the chin to 
the top of the forehead and the lowest roots of the hair, is a tenth 
part of the whole height; the open hand from the wrong to the tip 
of the middle finger is just the same.29 
Vitruvius delineates this system of man’s proportions at great length in 
De Architectura, codifying everything from the proper place of a man’s 
navel to the relationship that the length of one’s foot ought to have to the 
breadth of one’s breast.30 Despite all of this detail, in 149031 Leonardo da 
Vinci sketched out the bodily proportions supposed by Vitruvius and it 
became clear—at least to discerning eyes—that Vitruvius’ perfect man was 
an impossibility. As can be seen in da Vinci’s sketch, it is not geometrically 
feasible that the man’s navel marks the center of both a circle and the 
square.32 In true deconstructive fashion,33 the body’s center is already 
elsewhere even in this definitive structure of the human body. This 
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revelation, along with Vitruvian Man’s curiously in-turned and unstable 
right foot (and perhaps even his somewhat feminine coif) shows that even 
the ideal body that was to serve as the model for Roman and Greek 
architecture resisted systematization and representation. If transgender has 
something to do with how bodies break out of given molds, and how gender 
is never exhausted by two spaces, then this failure is hopeful. In other 
words, Vitruvius’s anxious attempt to systematize the human body is 
precisely what makes it exceed any such perfectly archival project. 
More significantly, one of the most legendary parts of Vitruvius’s work 
speaks directly to the relationship between gender and building practices. 
When he famously defines the three orders of Roman columns34—Doric, 
Ionic, and Corinthian—Vitruvius describes their respective origins in 
relation to human forms. In telling fashion, he begins by relating the 
genealogy of the two original columns: 
 Wishing to set up columns . . . but not having rules for their 
symmetry, and being in search of some way by which they could 
render them fit to bear a load and also of a satisfactory beauty of 
appearance, they measured the imprint of a man’s foot and 
compared this with his height. On finding that, in a man, the foot 
was one-sixth of the height, they applied the same principle to the 
column, and reared the shaft, including the capital, to a height six 
times its thickness at the base. Thus, the Doric column, as used in 
buildings, began to exhibit the proportions, strength, and beauty of 
the body of a man. Likewise, afterwards, when they desired to 
construct a temple to Diana as a new style of beauty, they 
translated these footprints into terms characteristic of the 
slenderness of women, and thus, first made a column the thickness 
of which was only one-eighth of its height, so that it might have a 
taller (that is, slenderer!) look. At the foot, they substituted the 
base in place of a shoe; in the capital, they placed the volutes, 
hanging down at the right like curly ringlets, and ornamented its 
front with cymatia and festoons of fruit arranged in place of hair; 
moreover, they brought the flutes down the whole shaft, falling 
like the folds in the robes worn by matrons. Thus, in the invention 
of the two different kinds of columns, they borrowed manly 
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beauty, naked and unadorned, for the one, and for the other 
delicacy, adornment, and proportions characteristic of women.35 
Even thousands of years ago, then, the norms of slenderness were writ 
large upon women’s presence in the public sphere in all too concrete 
ways.36 This idea sheds new light on the following claim made by Mark 
Wigley, a gender-savvy architectural theorist and Dean of the Graduate 
School of Architecture, Preservation, and Planning at Columbia. As he puts 
it in his intriguing history of closets and domestic privacy, “[A]rchitecture 
literally clothes the body public. . . . But architecture does not follow or 
resemble clothing. On the contrary, clothing follows architecture.”37 If 
clothing is modeled after architecture’s sheltering of the body, but Ionic 
columns are modeled after the robes of matrons, transgender is not 
exclusively a matter of bodies and clothes as we might think; rather, 
architecture already intervenes in our genders, if only because—as Wigley 
suggests—our ways of wearing clothing are under the constant influence of 
architectural fashion.38 
Vitruvius speaks more directly to our concerns when he describes the 
creation of the third—and still most popular39—form of Roman column: the 
Corinthian.40 Immediately, we get a sense that this third form is born of a 
queer hybrid of the male Doric column and the female Ionic column. 
[T]he Corinthian order never had any scheme peculiar to itself 
for its cornices or other ornaments, but may have mutules in the 
coronae and guttae on the architraves according to the triglyph 
system of the Doric style, or, according to Ionic practices, it may 
be arranged with a frieze adorned with sculptures and accompanied 
with dentils and coronae. . . . Thus a third architectural order, 
distinguished by its capital, was produced out of the two other 
orders.41 
As a transgender amalgam of the male and female architectural forms, 
this third column is, as the excerpt above indicates, neither male nor female 
and neither Doric nor Ionic. With regard to both gender and architectural 
order, the Corinthian is described by Vitruvius as a hybrid. Unlike the 
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unvarying proportions and rules of symmetry required of Doric and Ionic 
columns, the Corinthian style is decidedly volatile, fashioned by varying 
combinations of the male and female.42 In a description that might resonate 
with Judith Butler,43 this third order “never had any scheme peculiar to 
itself,” but rather, is a copy of which there is no true original. Indeed, 
offering an alternative to the former two orders and by making manifest the 
derivative process of each column’s creation, the Corinthian columns might 
serve as a reminder that even the forms we regard as originals are actually 
derivative.44 Although Vitruvius goes on to add that the Corinthian columns 
imitated the “slenderness of a maiden,”45 even this description makes clear 
what kind of “female” body is at stake here: a body that is in progress, a 
body exhibiting a changing (rather than static) sexuality, an immature body 
whose march toward reproductive adulthood has been halted, or a body that 
is immortalized in the sexually liminal space of puberty. Notwithstanding 
Vitruvius’s reliance on such norms, his tale of the maiden after whom this 
third order was designed offers a more radical story. 
A freeborn maiden of Corinth, just of marriageable age, was 
attacked by an illness and passed away. After her burial, her nurse, 
collecting a few little things which used to give the girl pleasure 
when she was alive, put them in a basket, carried it to the tomb, 
and laid it on top thereof, covering it with a roof-tile so that the 
things might last longer in the open air. This basket happened to be 
placed just above the root of an acanthus. The acanthus root, 
pressed down meanwhile though it was by the weight, when 
springtime came round put forth leaves and stalks in the middle, 
and the stalks, growing up along the sides of the basket, and 
pressed out by the corners of the tile through the compulsion of its 
weight, were forced to bend into volutes at the outer edges. Just 
then Callimachus . . . passed by this tomb and observed the basket 
with the tender young leaves growing round it. Delighted with the 
novel style and form, he built some columns after that pattern.46 
Therefore, while the male and female forms were designed purely on the 
basis of mimesis, the Corinthian’s hybrid form derives at once from the 
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form of the orphaned young maiden and from the persistent and distorted 
pieces of nature that wound round the relics of her death. Where Vitruvius 
hopes to find two original forms, a third not only confounds this binary but 
also, with his excessive retelling of its multiple origin stories, deconstructs 
his own attempt to create a linear and systematic history of gender and 
columns. As a form that (1) imitates bent plants that push against oppressive 
weights, and (2) takes what it likes from male and female forms without 
ever maturing into either, the Corinthian column is to Roman architecture 
what transgender may symbolize (rightly or wrongly) to hetero-normative 
culture: an unholy combination of norms, a memorial to the limits of its two 
ostensibly “original”47 forms, and a lesson in beauty and artfulness. 
However, irony is just one possible consequence of this reconfiguration 
of the third architectural order. In an extensive dialogue, prominent French 
architect Jean Nouvel and cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard arrive at this 
intriguing exclamation: “Let’s change the mode of reproduction for 
architecture! Let’s invent a sexual reproduction of architecture!”48 Although 
this discussion turns quickly into a brief meditation on “genetically 
programmed buildings”49—via Baudrillard’s customary mourning of non-
procreative sexuality50—it is an idea that deserves some consideration. In 
opposition to what we may understand to be Nouvel’s idea of buildings 
procreating like heterosexual subjects, might we ask instead if buildings are 
already engaged in the reproduction of sexuality? And to complete the 
cycle, how does sexual difference enable the production of buildings? When 
we consider precisely which root—the acanthus—wrestled its way around 
the roof tile to become the model for the Corinthian column, we might even 
have a literal response to Nouvel’s question of the reproduction of 
architecture. Many gardening guides confirm what is common knowledge 
among those who tend to such plants: the acanthus flower “[c]an spread 
invasively by creeping rootstocks, particularly in loose soils . . . [and is] 
difficult to eradicate once established since small sections of root left 
behind can sprout new plants”51 and it “suffers from a major identity 
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crisis.”52 Thus, the reproduction of the acanthus root (the root that led to the 
production of the Corinthian column) does not often spring from the care of 
parental hands sprinkling seeds or from a sexual (or even asexual) 
reproduction of plant seeds or spores. Rather, the reproduction of the 
invasive and durable acanthus plant is often occasioned by loss, removal, 
and abandoned roots. In sum, the Corinthian column that we know so well 
was based not only on a hybrid of male and female forms, but also on a 
flower that thrives in the face of its own death and abandonment—a flower 
that itself had to overcome architecture (the nurse’s roof tile) in order to 
survive. If, then, transgender sensibilities of non-mimetic reproduction and 
building and creation are at the very root of architecture’s diversity and of 
its deconstruction, we may reply to Nouvel: “the sexual reproduction of 
architecture” has long been at work, and it is decidedly transgender. 
II. GOING HOME AGAIN 
The previous section traces the way in which architectural forms 
(especially those that attempt to institute or archive architectural norms) 
sometimes involve a concurrent “concretization” of gender conventions. If 
the article has thus far revealed the way in which built space is based on 
genders, the following section takes up the reciprocal side of this fraught 
relationship between gender and architecture. That is, it will show that even 
our ways of thinking about our genders/bodies are informed by the 
conventions of certain architectural ideals, specifically the idea that “the 
home” is a good metaphor for our bodies.  
Despite the rather unwittingly queer history of transgender’s relationship 
to architecture we witnessed in Vitruvius, Jay Prosser is certainly right 
when he points out the following in his critical analysis of trans 
autobiographies: “home may prove a powerful organizing trope.”53 Indeed, 
Prosser shows that a dominant theme in many trans autobiographies (from 
Raymond Thompson54 to Mario Martino55 to Jan Morris56) is the desire to 
be “at home in one’s skin.”57 This home-like feeling is achieved in these 
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biographies by, as Prosser suggests, finally “feeling one owns”58 his or her 
body. Ownership is precisely the word here: everyday trans narratives often 
configure the completion of medicalized transition59 as both the climax of 
one’s life narrative and also as a process of “coming home to the self 
through body.”60 Considering the very limited set of acceptable narratives 
of body transformation available in our culture, no person or group should 
be blamed for connecting to one or another of these emotional narratives. At 
current, it is difficult to imagine any other climactic narrative moment of 
trans-embodiment other than transition, especially insofar, as Prosser 
suggests, “the point of every narrative is, after all, to return home.”61 He 
argues that a pre-operative transsexual’s sense of not feeling “at home in 
one’s skin” is entirely valid and unsurprising.62 He validates this common 
transsexual narrative of living in the “wrong body” when he suggests that a 
transsexual’s sense of self is no banal version of Cartesianism but is already 
thoroughly material.63 The transsexual ego is, in Freudian parlance, “a 
mental projection of the surface of the body.”64 In this light, Prosser 
reminds us that changes in skin or surface are truly substantive, insofar as 
skin is psychosomatic—both a bearer and producer of psychic symptoms.65 
Feeling at home in one’s body is surely, then, an urgent need that few, if 
any, would deny. However, might the forcefulness of this imperative to feel 
at home in one’s body also derive from the limited and limiting ideas our 
culture holds about the very idea of homes? To what extent is the “home” of 
trans-embodiment a capitalist, middle-class, and heteronormative home? Is 
it the very kind of owned home from which so many trans people have been 
evicted, in which so many have been abused, and within which so many 
have barricaded themselves? Indeed, the houses and the homes we create 
within them are not necessarily benign. For those who suffer domestic 
abuse, those who are not yet of age, those whose homeless milieu 
underlines the classist privatization of sexuality, or those whose homes 
represent the impossibility of a satisfying public life, this point is obvious. 
In addition, the very impetus for the building of homes reflects a certain 
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(potentially unqueer or even unfeminist) orientation toward gender. Once 
again, Wigley makes an assertive case for the idea that architecture and 
gender norms are mutually constitutive. 
Marriage is the reason for building a house. The house appears 
to make a space for the institution. But marriage is already spatial. 
It cannot be thought about outside the house that is its condition of 
possibility before its space. The word Oikos66 refers to the identity 
between the physical building and the family it houses. . . . The 
physical house is the possibility of the patriarchal order that 
appears to be applied to it. . . . The virtuous woman becomes 
woman-plus-house or, rather, woman-as-housed, such that her 
virtue cannot be separated from the physical space.67 
In light of this problematic history of the house, much is at stake in one’s 
affective experience of returning (or wanting to return) home to one’s self 
through transition. Because the transsexual project, as Prosser conceives of 
it, is oriented toward the fulfillment of a single goal, its narratives reach 
their climax at the cost of neatly wrapping up the lifelong process of living 
and continually becoming a gendered body. Similarly, insofar as the very 
idea of a home is grounded in the hetero-normative structure of the family, 
to conceive of the body as a home to be owned entails relying on the very 
binary system of gender that constrains trans-embodiment in the first 
instance. The capitalistic sense of ownership implied in this model is also 
problematic, insofar as this imperative to own objects permanently is a part 
of what generates the hetero-normative mythology that every human body 
is naturally stable and fixed. In sum, trans people and our narratives seem 
(to many minds) to return home—reach their respective climaxes—at the 
cost of accepting the system of binary gender and discourses of bodily 
ownership and stasis that already devalue transgender and transsexuality. 
Prosser recognizes a paradox between what he calls the transsexual 
narrative of “going home” and the queer narrative of “resisting 
domestication.”68 As an alternative, he gestures toward specifically 
transgender narratives. Books such as Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch Blues, 
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Prosser argues, “contain important ambivalences about home and territory, 
belonging, and political affiliation.”69 Prosser regards transgender—as 
opposed to specifically transition-oriented transsexuality—as a mode of 
embodiment that is itself ambivalent about gender; Prosser suggests this 
ambivalence is also apparent in the main character’s fraught relationship 
with her home. In this sense, we could say that Jess’s ambivalence about 
“housing” her body in a particular gender category is echoed in a similar 
refusal to conform or belong in any simple way to a single place (her small 
hometown, New York City, and so on). All in all, Prosser offers a rather 
neat systemization: transsexuals go home vis-à-vis the self, queers are anti-
domestic, and transgender people offer the crucial third way. This 
formulation is keen and alluring, and the way in which it credits transgender 
people with the most complicated version of home seems a unique one in 
Prosser’s otherwise specifically transsexuality-focused text.  
More interestingly, this valorization of ambivalence about ownership (for 
Prosser, the body as a matter of ownership) is one shared by many critical 
thinkers of social class. For instance, in his “Refuge for the Homeless,” 
Theodor Adorno advocates just such an indifferent orientation to one’s 
property, though he writes about ownership in a much more literal sense. 
The best mode of conduct . . . still seems an uncommitted, 
suspended one: to lead a private life, as far as the social order and 
one’s own needs will tolerate nothing else, but not to attach weight 
to it. . . . It is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home. 
This gives some indication of the difficult relationship in which the 
individual now stands to his property, as long as he still possesses 
anything at all. The trick is to keep in view, and to express, the fact 
that private property no longer belongs to one.70 
These versions of ambivalence are, however, strikingly different from the 
one that Prosser champions. While Prosser sees in Leslie Feinberg’s 
character, Jess Goldberg, a protagonist who journeys from home to home, 
the transient homes that Jess crafts are rather regular. As she71 says of her 
first apartment in New York City, “Gradually I bought furniture . . . I went 
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crazy buying sheets at Macy’s. As my house came together, I suddenly 
wanted things that made my body feel good . . . And then one day I looked 
around at my apartment and realized I’d made a home.”72  
Adorno advocates something different: acknowledging the inescapable 
unhomeliness of every home, resigning oneself to the conditions of 
ownership in late capitalism,73 rather than capitulating to them and refusing 
to perpetuate the illusion that renters and even owners actually possess 
anything at all. Of course, Jess’s position in her culture is radically different 
from Adorno’s: a private space, limited though it may be, might be Jess’s 
only chance for a home-like experience of her body. Furthermore, Jess’s life 
of passing in New York City itself confuses the realms of public and private 
on which Adorno relies; passing74 creates for Jess her own dangerous 
private(s), even if discovery of the would-be private sphere of her body 
consistently governs every experience she has of publicity.  
Feinberg’s latest novel, Drag King Dreams, offers a more intensely 
ambivalent series of transgender homes, this time of protagonist Max 
Rabinowitz. Max could be regarded as the older and more resigned version 
of the young Jess Goldberg, especially in hir relationship to hir home. 
Having substituted Jess’s shopping spree at Macy’s for hir own murals and 
painted Jewish verse, Max must explain to hir friend Heshie the origin of 
hir apartment’s painted walls:  
“What will you do when all the walls are full?” he asks. I shrug. 
“I usually have to move before that happens. . . . Suddenly all the 
things about my apartment that make it my home, that feel so 
familiar, seem bizarre and strange, even to me.75  
By anticipating hir inevitable departure, even as ze creates hir home, (and 
by allowing others to enter hir space) Max knows that “home” is only 
temporary. In the sense that Max does not emotionally invest in hir home as 
a permanent place of comfort, ze is less at home in hir home than Jess 
seems to be. When Jess’s apartment building burns down in Stone Butch 
Blues, she is crushed; when Max’s apartment is robbed and hir Jewish art 
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defaced with swastikas and words like “faggot,”76 ze leaves hir apartment 
that night without hir belongings and never returns (which is not to say ze 
was not at all affected). Still, Feinberg’s increasingly Adornian version of 
the ambivalent trans home complicates what Prosser calls Feinberg’s earlier 
“crucial irony about home: although home is a place we make up, 
recognizing its fictionality only fuels its mythic lure.”77 As Max Rabinowitz 
and Adorno both suggest, “recognizing [the] fictionality” of one’s home 
does indeed change the way one lives within it. 
Neither character, of course, offers a model for life. However, there is a 
crucial and instructive difference between them: an ambivalence towards 
ownership and homey comfort in Max’s case compared to a spirited hope 
for comfort in Jess’s case. Whereas many of us can’t help but shuttle 
between these two positions, these companion texts can show us some of 
the stakes and possible outcomes of variously associating comfort with 
homes and with gender “homes.” These can be hopeful avenues of thought 
for those who desire new ways to think about pre-operative trans bodies as 
something other than unhomely spaces and for people of all kinds who 
believe that transsexuality is not merely the unradical resolution (or 
uncritical happy ending) of a tale of coming home. 
But how can we conceptualize transition, then, if not as Prosser’s 
“homesick”78 resolution of the transsexual plot? If we continue to entertain 
Adorno’s sense of home, we might consider one’s “transition” as yet 
another move in a lifetime of stopovers. To follow Nouvel’s sense that 
“[t]he future of architecture will not be architectural”79 perhaps this means 
that the future of trans-embodiment will not be transsexual—that is, not 
exclusively. The future of trans-embodiment may, instead, come to make 
affective demands on everyone in new ways, and trans and queer activists 
and thinkers are well-equipped to lead the charge into new conceptions of 
coalition practices and politics. Although Adorno’s clearly non-transgender 
perspective might be seen as an indication of his uselessness here, it is 
precisely that perspective that allows for just such a crucial corrective to 
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Prosser: nobody—at least in late capitalism—is at home in their homes, 
their bodies, or elsewhere. This is what is meant by the idea that the future 
of trans-embodiment might make affective demands on or invitations to 
those who seem not to belong to “trans.” The very material tribulations of 
many normatively gendered people—fear of harassment and rape, poverty, 
and perhaps especially the daily and dissimulated tasks of maintaining one’s 
body—all evince this idea. However, Prosser seems to believe that 
normatively gendered people have succeeded in becoming properly 
gendered citizens when they psychically invest in their bodies, while “if 
[transsexuals] feel confined in the wrong body on a fundamental level, it 
must be said that [transsexuals] fail to own [their] own skin, to accept it as 
[their] own.”80 A reciprocal reading of this question of “own[ing] skin” 
might hold that trans people are successful in shattering the illusion that any 
of us can ever simply be at home in our bodies, even as normatively 
gendered people work hard to maintain this illusion.  
If we are committed not only to vindicating transsexual experience (an 
important goal, which Prosser meets successfully), but also to establishing a 
political ethics of trans-embodiment that involves all bodies, then this might 
be one way to start. Perhaps Prosser’s image of the refusal (he might prefer 
the word inability) to “own” the body is not only indicative of a larger 
condition of culture, but might also be regarded as a model for relating to 
the body. Cressida Heyes critiques precisely this ownership-oriented model 
of relating to our bodies. As she describes it, our current model of the body-
crafting or “somatic individual relies on sovereign power—on an 
understanding of the self as monarch, residing within the palace of the 
body, guiding its renovation so that its unique status will be made 
manifest.”81 Heyes refuses the idea that anyone exercises “sovereign power” 
in a world where gender (for instance) is an intersubjective production that 
occurs through relationships and the limited choices made available in our 
culture. Her rhetoric also points out that a very controlling idea of 
ownership guides the current models available for thinking of self-crafting 
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our bodies. If, as Marxist thinkers like Adorno and Feinberg might suggest, 
one does not simply “own” one’s body—if the body is never an instrument 
or product of our complete and independent agency—then the body 
demands a different kind of care, a self-reflexive fashioning and continuous 
crafting rather than a static having and holding. For such a nomadic sense of 
our bodily homes, a generally applicable ethics of sexually charged body 
morphology could very well offer our culture a useful model. 
CONCLUSIONS: NOSTALGIA & ARCHIVES 
Yet, for all of these attempts at disrupting our desire to return to safe 
homes, it is unmistakable that whatsoever our cultural conditions, feeling 
safe and protected is not only a positive feeling, but also an urgent need. If, 
thus far, this article has brought the more radical history of transgender 
architecture to bear on our current conceptions of “home” as a metaphor, 
perhaps the complementary project that remains is to think differently about 
the actual design of these homes. Does built space necessarily wield the 
incomparable power of nostalgia with which we imbue our homes? If 
bodies and buildings are mutually constitutive, surely we are not subject to 
the ambivalent attraction of our homes without concurrently affecting our 
spaces. Jennifer Bloomer agrees, as she suggests that a trans person’s 
supposed homesickness must be echoed by architecture’s own body-
sickness. 
Architecture, “the Mother of the Arts,” is, after all . . . not an 
object-art, but an object-longing art. And architectural drawings, 
compositions of lines suggesting form, can be construed as the 
longing marks of architecture . . . [What is] the place of nostalgia, 
homesickness, the longing for home, in contemporary Western 
architecture . . . [?] In its subjugation of matter by form, the 
modern concept of design necessarily is dominated by a nostalgia 
for matter, fetishization of an imagined absence . . . For a nexus of 
lines, whether drawn, virtual, simulated, or troped, is the mark of a 
longed-for object. Form sitting on the lid of its other, matter.82 
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Baudrillard concurs by suggesting that “architecture is a mixture of 
nostalgia and extreme anticipation,”83 while Prosser argues that transsexuals 
exercise the unique capacity to be nostalgic for bodies that were never 
theirs. If, as Bloomer suggests, architectural design longs for embodiment, 
and if, as Prosser suggests, bodies long for homes, then our nostalgia for 
bodily homes is no simple matter. These different forms of nostalgia are 
hopelessly intertwined. In fact, to refute Bloomer’s final statement above, 
both nostalgias confound the distinction between pure form and matter by 
imbuing form with a material existence and affective power; transsexuals, 
in Prosser’s estimation, are affectively nostalgic for body parts they never 
had, and architects sketch physical plans for matter that does not yet exist. 
Architecture’s appeal to gendered embodiment and trans-embodiment’s 
supposed desire for homeliness, then, are not simply converse sides of a 
binary relationship in which one represents form while the other represents 
matter. They both need and desire each other.  
Throughout this analysis, the concept of the ever-dynamic and never-
complete archive has remained more than an undercurrent. Vitruvius’s own 
compulsion to document the folklore of architecture is its own archive, one 
to which we returned in order to reopen our conceptions of transgender’s 
relation to built space, and one whose coherence and linear narrative path is 
disrupted by the non-mimetic and multi-origined Corinthian—
“transgender”—column. In response to Prosser, I suggest that instead of 
conceiving of transsexuality as a journey home, we might think of our 
practices of the body as a series of stopovers that are, nonetheless, serious 
and equally oriented toward finding a self through the body. In other words, 
our bodies could be lived as archives rather than as homes. Transgender and 
transsexual bodies not only actively archive—through/with bodies—the 
possibility of moving beyond binary gender, but also unwittingly archive 
the violence that our culture perpetuates on those who attempt to do so. But 
what is useful about configuring trans people as archivists of culture? 
Derrida gestures toward an answer. On one hand, his concept of “archive 
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fever” describes Prosser’s version of transsexuality: a “compulsive, 
repetitive, and nostalgic desire for the archive, an irrepressible desire to 
return to the origin, a homesickness, a nostalgia for the return to the most 
archaic place of absolute commencement.”84 On the other hand, having 
archive fever “is [also] to burn with a passion. It is never to rest, 
interminably, from searching for the archive right where it slips away. It is 
to run after the archive, even if there’s too much of it, right where 
something in it anarchives [or, erases] itself.”85 This second sense of 
archive fever acknowledges that, try as we might, we will never get home—
no surgery or bodily modification will return us to our “commencement,”86 
or to a final resting place of selfhood. Crucially, however, it is precisely this 
impossibility that fuels one’s insatiable desire to pursue the archive 
nonetheless. This active, impassioned, and restless orientation to one’s own 
body-archive cures the homesickness that Prosser attributes solely to 
transsexuals, suggesting that we all may be—or could be—infected with a 
more radical affliction than that offered by the coherent trans subject of 
identity politics: a high-grade gender fever. 
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